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1 IntroduCtion 
The softening of govemance modes is a remarkable trend in the EU. Environmental governance is no exception 
The paper takes the EU climate change strategy as an example qf this softening and sheds light upon some 
features of soft governance, which are multi-level networking and a market mechanism. The paper is structured 
as follows. Section 2 gives general features of modes of EU environmental gbvernance, demonstrating two 
facets: EU wide harmonisation based on the Community method and the softening of governance modes 
Section 3 traces out the developmental process of the EU climate change strategy, paying attention to the use of 
soft instruments for establishing a shared undeirstanding of climate change issues. Section 4 elucidates the 
softness of the EU cliDlate change strategy from four viewpoints: target-setting, policy-frarning, policy-making 
and individual measures. On the basis of these arguments, the paper briefly suggests the implication of soft 
governance on European integration and disintegration, 
2. Two Facets of EU Environmental Governance 
2-1 EU Wide Harmonisation 
EU environmental law comprises a huge amount of instruments. The number seems to be more than one 
thousand! (Wilkinson et al. 2004: 7; IEEP 2004), though it depends on whether or not to include modification 
and soft instruments such as recommendations, opinions, notices, intemational political agreements and so on. 
Presumably, the range from 580 to 850 may be plausible (MacCormick 2001: 17-8; Weale et al. 2000: 2). The 
consequence of this huge legislation is the heavy burden of their transposition in Member States ~md of judicial 
review by the Court of J ti An ~stimate shows that 'over 80 per cent of UK environmental policy now us rce. 
originates from the EU' (Wilkinson et al. 2004: 7). The Commission reports that, as of December 31 2003, the~e 
were 3927 infringement cases and the total volume of infringement cases initiated by the Commission were 
2708 (COM (2004) 839: point.1 l) The Community method has produced this troublesome situation, and this is 
a background against which new modes of govemance havet,een introduced. H6ritier points out that, in terms of 
policy development, environmental policy oan be compared with social policy. In the latter, even the use of soft 
instruments means the first step towards European policy-making. In contrast, the adoption of non-binding 
targets in environmental polity means the shift from hierarchy to self-regulatlon (H~ritier 2002) 
The Community method in enviroumental legislation is as follows The EC Treaty provides two procedures for 
enviroumental legislation: the co-decision procedure of Article 175 (1) EC and the consultation procedure of 
Article 175 (2) EC. The former is a usual legal base i~ environmental legislation, in which the Council can act 
by qualified majority votin~ 'General action programmes setting out priority objectives to be attained' are also 
based on this co-decision procedure. The latter is for (a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature; (b) measures 
affecting town and country planning, quantitative management of water resources and land use except waste 
management; and (c) the choice of energy sources and the structure of energy supply. In these areas, the Council 
has to act unanir~lously, though it may define matters that are decided by a qualified majority (Article 175 (2) 
EC). Many climate change polic.ies are fallen into areas of Article 175 (2) EC, though the Cotnmission and the 
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Council have chosen the co-decision procedure of Article 175 (1) EC in the adoption of climate change related 
instruments. However, these instruments are soft in terms of subsfantive obligations as will be mentioned later, 
2-2 Soft Governance 
Enviroumental legislation has been seen as an area in which better lawmaking and simplification need to be 
pursued. For example, the Comrhission lists up European sustainable development strategy, insisting that an 
impact assessment of legislation must be conducted (COM (2002) 275: 3) This trend of reviewing existing 
legislative policies is in line with the White Paper on European Govemance (hereinafter the Governance Paper) 
(COM (2001) 428). In some degree, non-legalistic approaches in the Governance Paper is followed by the Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme (Decision 1600/2002/EC) (hereinafter the 6th EAP), which states that '[olther 
options [than legislation] for achieving environmental objectives should also be considered' (Preamble, 
point,12), and advocates that '[a] strategic integrated ap~roach, incorporating new ways of working with the 
market, involving citizens, enterprises and other stakeholders is needed. ' (Ibid., point.14) This trend already 
begnn in the 5th EAP of 1992 (OJ 1992 C13817), which indicated that legislative measures alone were not 
sufficient and participatory schemes based on the pririciple of shared responsibility needs to be sought. On this 
view, non-legislative measures such as market-based instruments and environmental agreements have been 
offered as cost-effective policy in~truments (ex. Commission Recomm 96n33/EC, preamble) On the basis of 
the strategy of this 5th EAP, civic inclusion and softer legalisation became the features of EU environrnental 
governance in the 1 990s 
Two examples demonstrate a multi-level net~ork style of EU environmental governance: the 1993 European 
Green Forum (The European Consultative Forum on the Environment and Sustainable Development) and the 
1992 IMPEL. The former is the general bonsultative forum and invites NGOs, industry/business, Iocal 
authorities and non-EU states (Commission 200la; MacCormick 2001: 60). The contribution of this Forum to 
the establishment and refinement of the principle of environmental integration and the creation of the 6th EAP is 
reported to be visible (Commission 200la: 18-19), although the chairman carefully mentioned in the self-
assessment report that 'it is difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of this influence' (Ibid.. 3). Since this 
institutional innovation in the early 90s, stakeholder consultations around individual environmental medias 
and/or emission substances have certainly become usual practices. 
The IMPEL is the EU network for implementatio_n and enforcement of environmental law. It consists of 29 
countries, including No~way and Turkey (SEC (2004) 1025: 23) Interestingly, the Decision (1600/2002), which 
establishes the 6th EAP, is referred to as its formal legal base (1bid,). In this network, national authorities hold 
informally biannual meetings, which are chaired by the DG ENV and a Member State holding the EU 
Presidency. An example of programmes of the IMPEL is. IMPEL Review lhitiative, in which the IMPEL works 
on Recommendation 2001/33 1/EC on minimum criteria for enviroumental inspections, issuing its Management 
Reference Book for Environmental Inspectorates, which provides good examples for Member States' 
environrnental inspectors (Ibid., 24). The other example is IMPEL Better Legislation Project, in which IMPEL 
delivers recommendations for legislative improvement in the transposition of EU environmental legislation into 
national measures (1bid,, 24-5). In 1998, AC-IMPEL was set up ~n order that officials from CEEC governments 
and EU Member States discuss implementation issues for accession period (MacCormick 2001: 67). Together 
with the EEA (European Environmental Agency based in Copenhagen), the IMPEL demonstrates one dimension 
of the network-like character of EU environmehtal governance 
Scholarly attention has already been paid to characteristics of new modes of EU environmental governance. 
H6ritier explores the mode of EU environmental governanc~ by paying attention to m~thods of target 
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development and implementation: one is 'reputation mechanisms and learning'; the other 'voluntary accords' 
(Heritier 2002) A point is institution-building for multi-1evel participation into target-setting and time-table 
setting and publicising of monitoring resultsi Scott formulates EU environmental governance as 'the 
"procedurally constrained Member States flexibility in implementation" model' (Scott 2000: 280), drawing on 
the IPPC Directive, In this model, substantive obligations are soft, however, procedural obligatiobs are hard 
Scott submits that this model implicates frve values: flexibility; decentralisation; payticipation; reflexivity and 
deliberation (Ibid., 265-6) Weale et al characterises EU environmental governance as being multi-level, 
horizontally complex, evolving and incomplete (Weale et al 2000: 6) In this open-ended governance oriented to 
learning, 
'National state executives and supranational institution~, distinctive national systems of policy-making 
and international mechanisms for problem solving coexist and will continue to play important role in 
environmental policy-making' (Ibid.. 6), 
These characteristics of EU environmental goverhance seem to bc a contrast to the orientation to legal 
harmonisation. While it may be said that 'soft' environmental governance are supplementary to 'hard' 
environmental legislation, this softness has much more entered into EU climate change polioies, as will be 
examined below, 
3 Policy DevelOpment 
The EU climate change strategy has developed since the last half of the 1980s. The noteworthy is the uncertainty 
of the issue and the 'softne:ss' of instruments. 
3-1 Uncertainty , 
Climate change is a wide-ranging, serious but uncertain issue. On the one hand, Climate-related. disasters are 
huge as follows (UNEP 2005) 
･ Changes on the earth such as ice cap melting, sea level tise, ocean circulation upheaval (ex. gulf streanl 
modificatiOn), changes in precipitation; 
･ Extreme weather ~vents such as Europe cooling, floods, storms or cyclones, droughts, heat waves; 
･ Other majcr threats such as diseases spiead, biodiversity losses and famines 
Already global average surface temperature increased over the 20th Century by 0.6 degree Celsius, and the 
famous scenarios of the IPCC are that, until the year 2100, the temperaiure may increase by IA - 5 8 degree 
Celsius and sea level may increase by 9 - 88 cm. Presumably, the commj g Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC will raise the precision of the scenarios. Climate change is already under wa)L A policy response is 
required not only to the source of global wawning but also to ~he mitigation and adaptation to climate change. 
On the other hand, the mitigation and adaptation is still under preparation, though capacity building in 
developing countries for this mitigation and adaptation now becomes the priority of development policies of 
developed countries including the EU. Any reduction target of GHGS such as C02 become~ quite uncertain in 
terTns of policy effectiveness. This is because climate sciences are still to a large degree uncertain. The reports of 
the n)CC depend on the analysis of six scenarios based pn about 40 scenarios (IPCC 200lc: 144-5) In terms of 
scientific certainty, the scientific base of tafget-setting for GHGS reduction is far from complete. In its 
assessment report, the IPCC states that: 
'Climate change decision-making is essentially a sequential process under general uncertaint~･, (IPCC 
-73-
200lb: 12). 
'The relevant question is not "what is the best course for the next 100 years", but rather "what is the 
best course for the near term given the expected long-term climate change and accompanying 
uncertairuies".' (Ibid.) 
Certainly, C02 concentration in the atmosphere, which causes temperature rise, has been and still is rising. 
While in the last 400000 years the concentration was not beyond 300ppm (UNEP 2005: 9), the present level is 
about 370ppm! However, what must be clarified is, for example, carbon cycle between atmosphere, ocean and 
land. A human-induced climate change by fossil fuel burning and the change of land use might be only a 
hypothesis if the understanding of this carbon cycle falls short, and the mod~lling and simulation of carbon cycle 
at the global scale is a very difficult task because of too complicated interrelations between atmosphere, ocean 
and land. Rather, what the IPCC pays attention to is 'a small but significant pertulbation of a hug~ global cycle' 
(n?CC 200la: 187) This may mean that any amount of reduction would already be in vain. While any climate 
sceptics faiiled to be the major force (Skodvin 2000: 165), the scientific base of climate change policies is still 
not so reliable. 
3-2 A Shared Understanding 
The development of ule EU climate change strategy can be divided into two phases: before and aft~r the year 
1997. The first phase was for the construction of a shared understanding. Individual instruments were simple and 
not successful. 
In 1985, the Commission first raised a need for EU (EC) policies on climate change> by issuing a research policy 
statement (McCormick 2001: 280). It seents that this was response to the 1985 Villach international research 
conference on climate change The 19g8 UN General Assembly recalled the conclusibn of this Villach 
conference (A/RES/43/53, Deeember 1988) and graded up climate change as an international agenda. The 
development of EU Climate change Policies have been contextualised by evolvin~ international climate change 
regime. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1994 (Decision 94/69fEC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (Decision 2002/358/~C) have framed the EU climate change strategy, as will be 
examined below. What needs to be paid attention to is the fact that the intemational agenda of climate change 
had been incorporated into the EU through Commisslon communications, Council resolutions and European 
Council Presidency Conclusions, not through political statements by Member States leadeis, and in turn the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were incorporated into the EU Iegal order. This demonstrates that soft 
instruments are a tool of developing a shared understanding between EU institutions and Member Sates The 
following shows this process 
･ 13 October 1986. Resolution on measures to counteract the rising concentration of carbon diqxide in the 
atmo.sphere (the "greenhouse" effect). OJ 1986 C2551272 
･ 1･6 November 1988 COM (.1988) 656-1 Communication to the Council: the greenhouse effect and the 
commission work programrne concerning the evaluation of policy options to deal with the greenhouse effect 
/ COM (1988) 656-2 Draft Council Resolution on the Greenhouse effect and the Community, 
･ 2-3 December 1988. Rhodes Declaration on the Environment. Presidency Conclusions, Rhodes, December 1988 (Bull. EC 12-1988), : 
･ 20 July 1989. Council Resolution on the greenhouse effect and the Community. OJ 1989 C183/4. 
. 25-6 June 1990. Declaration by the European Council on the Environmental Imperative Presidency 
Conclusions, Dublin. June 1990 (Bull. EC 6-1990) 
･ 29 October 1990. Conclusions. of the joint Counpil of Enviroument and Energy Mljnisters (EC Bull. 1990 
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October, point. 13,77). 
In this process, scientific unceitainties were rejected as an excuse of delaying policy responses to climate 
change The 1988 Rhodes Declaration on the Envlronment underlined 'the greenhouse effect' along with 
depletion of the ozone layer and the loss of biodiversity (Bull. EC 12-1988, point.1.1.11), and then the 1989 
Council Resolution stated that: 
'Such a response [to problems of climate change] should be made without further delay, irrespective of 
remaining uncertainties on some scientific aspects of the greenhouse effect' (OJ 1989 CIB3/4: para.1). 
In part this is because the EU aimed at establi~hing a ~trong position in preparation for UN Conference on 
Development and Environment (or the Rio Sununit) of 1992, as the 1990 Dublin Declaration claimed (Bull. EC 
6-1990: Annex H, point 1.36), In this process of norm-building, the EU established the frrst target-setting in the 
1990 joint Energy/Environment Council. This target was the 'stabilization of the total carbon dioxide emissions 
by the year 2000 at the 1990 Ievel in the Conimunity as a whole' (cited from Dir. 93/76/EEC (SAVE 
Programme), Preamble) It was nonLbinding and quite flexible The conditions were that ' other lead ng 
countries undertook similar commitments' (1bid.). Furthermore, 
'. . Member States which start from relatively low levels of energy consumption and therefore low 
emissions measured on a per capita or other appropriate basis are entitled to have carbon dioxide 
targets and/or strategies corresponding to their economic and social development. , (1bid.) 
Though other leading countries did not begin to undertake similar commitments in a visible manner until the 
signing of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, this flexible commitment anticipated the principle of 'common but 
differentiated responsibility' established by the UNFCCC. 
The Commission announced the start of climate change policies in the 4th EAP of 1987 (OJ 1987 C328/5, point 
2,3,20) and envisaged a set of climate change policies in the 5th EAP (OJ 1993 C138/5) (Kr~mer 2003: 299). 
The strategy in this early stage of the development of climate change policies was simple. Measures to combat 
global warming were 'a three part climate package' (McCormick 2001: 281): energy efficiency and 
alternative/renewable euergy, monitoring mechanisms and a carbonlenergy tax (COM (1991) 249). These 
measures had been proposed and implemented in forms of (lirectives and decisions; however, they were by and 
large 'soft' in teuns of flexibility in meeting obligations. With regards to energy, financial supports were 
provided for national programmes: SAVE Programmes for an energy efficiency; and ALTENER Programmes 
for a renewable programme. However, the amount of financial supports was small I Energy policies have 
developed by arranging indicative targets and annual report requirements (ex. Dir. 2003/30fEC) A monitoring 
mechanism was set up by Decision 93/389/EC, under which ,Member States are required to submit national 
reports concerning the monitoring of all anthropogenic GHGS and the Commission publishes regularly reports 
This monitoring mechanism has later evolved in order to meet the Kyoto commitments (Decision 280/2004/EC) 
Fiscal measures did not reach consensus At first, the Commission envisaged a carbon tax (COM (92) 226) 
Although the Parliament supported the adoption of the carbon tax, the Council did not accept it. For any fiscal 
measure, Member States were quite sensitive and, even after the carbon tax was 'dressed up as an energy tax', 
strong opposition continued (Wettestad 2005: 8) Later on, a fiscal policy on climate change has been 
established as a flexible energy tax directive (Dir. 2003/96/EC), as will be examined below. 
1 Dec 91/565 (SAVE l)= 35 million Euros: Dec 96n37 (SAVE)= 45 million Euros; Dec 647/2000 (SAVE ID: 66 million Eums; Dec 93/500 
(ALTENER): 40 million Euros; Dec 646/2000 (ALTENER Il): 77 million Eums. See Kr~mer (2003: 307) 
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The EU clim~te change strategy, not a mere aggregation of individual measures, has emerged since the signing 
of Kyoto Protocol of 1997 After this year 1997, a renewal policy-making started. That is illustrative of a spread 
of soft governance in the EU in a more visible way. 
4 Governance Modes 
As noted above, the huge amount of EU environmental instruments seem to bc illustrative of 'Brussels conveyor 
belt of legislation' (Parker 2005); however, new modes of governance for the environmerit have also become 
marked in the EU. While Trubek et al properly points out 'hybridity' (Trubek et al 2005). EU environmental 
governance as a political process for setting a politicaJ goal and controlling/monitoring compliance (Kohler-
Koth 2005) seems to gr~dually become characterised as stakeholder inclusion and softer legalisation, as 
suggested above. The emergence of this soft governance in the EU climate chang~ strategy can be grasped from 
four dimensions of governance system: target-setting; policy-framing; policy-making; and individual measures. 
These are summarised in Table I . 
4-1 Target-setting 
The burden-sharing of the target of GHGS emissions reduction in the EU was set up as a political common 
position in the Environmental Council. After this pure intergovemmental political process, the legal translation 
of the burden-sharing agreement was carried out. Table 2 shows the outcome 
The kyoto Protocol (signing in December 1997) set up binding targets 0~ G.HGs emissions reduction for the so-
called Annex I countries> which are 38 developed countries including EUl5 In March 1997, under the Dutch 
Presidency, the Environmental Council already reached ~m agreement for sharing the burden of GHGS emissions 
reduction, 'the adoption of which were initially seemed impdssible' (Lefevere 2000: 363) This agreement was 
nine months before the Kyoto COP3 (the third Confeience of the Parties to UNFCCC). The target was so 
ambitious: a 15~~,, cut in EU emissions of three GHGS (C02, methane and nitrous oxide) from the 1990 Ievel by 
2010 (Lefevere 2000: 363), and the burden of each Member State was. allocated as if the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility was applied (for burdens of each Member State, see Table 2). This burden-
sharing agreement was far from porfect because the total emissions of agr~ed burdens '~mounted to only two-
tbirds ofthe 159{(,' (Ibid.), Notwithstanding, this become the EU position on the international negotiation in the 
Kyoto COP3 . 
An aim of the EU in the n~gotiation in Kyoto was to gain the entitlement for the EUl5 as a whole to meet the 
Kyoto targets, such as a model of the 1997 burden-sharing agreement, and the EU won the negotiation- The 
Kyoto commitments of EU countries were all -8%; however, the EU15 are allowed to re-allocate the burden of 
emissions. reduction. This is called 'bubble' (see table 2). The March 1997 burden-sharing agreement was a 
model of this method, and now this agreement, whlch was for -15% reduction, required to be modified 
according to the ncw -8% reduction target. Then, the 1998 burden-sharing agteement was adopted in the 
Environmental Council. For the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the 'legal translation' of this agreement (COM 
(2999) 88: 2) was nceded, and it was incorporated into Decision 2002/358/EC, which transposes the Kyoto 
Protocol into the EU Iegal order. In this way, the so-called 'EU bubble' ~oint fulfilment of the EU target: -8% 
reduction) was established2 (See table 2) 
Here' attention needs to be paid to the fact that these two burden-sharing agreements were not owing to the 
2 NBW Member States are ou  of this joint fulfilment of the EU target. They have tbeir own targets, which ~e ~~% except H gary d P I d 
These two have ~5% reduction commitrnent. See the Colnmission (2003: 10) 
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proposals of the Commission (Kr~mer 2003: 303) They were outcomes of a pure intergovernmental political 
processes. Soon after the adoption of the 19~8 burden-sharing agreement, the EU climate ohange strategy has 
begun to develop. : : 
4-2 Policy-framing 
A non-binding guideline for developing the principl~ of environmental integration (hereinafter PEI), which the 
Airlsterdarn Treaty of 1991 graded up by newly establishing Article 6 EC as one of basic princlples of the EU, 
has framed EU PQlicies for Climate chan~~ as a single and fundamental issue against which the EU must tac~le 
This process of developing the PEI is, to a large degr~ei noi legislative but political process A non-binding 
guideline is the 199S Guidelines for ipartnership for Integration ~f Environment into other policies (COM (98) 
333), which initiated the Cardiff process that is followed by the EU Sustainable Development Strategy. 
Cllmate change rs a cross-sectional issue. This means that wide-ranging legal bases are required for climate 
change policies The expected legal bases are agriculture (Article 37 EC), transport (Article 71 or 80 EC), 
taxation (Article 93 EC), internal mark~t (Article 95 EC), trade (Article 133 EC) and energy (Article 175 (2) or 
308 EC) (Kr~mer 2003: 300). However, many instruments for climate change policies have been based on 
Article 175 (1) EC (Ibid.). Climate change policies have been framed as a single issue through the process of 
developing the PEI. While the PEI does not set any substantive obligation but procedural obligations and has 
been applied by the Court of Justice to the legal base disputes in which environmental legislation based on non-
environmental legal bases is contested (Usui 2005), this PEI also seems to have a sort of policy-framing effect 
In the process of developing the PEI, climate change policy-making has been stressed as one of major obj~ctives 
of the EU. This deYelopment has been prompted and supported by 'Guidelines for a Partnership for Integratlon 
of Environment into other policies' (COM (98) 333), proposed by the Commission ahd agreed by the Council 
The Guidelines require the EU institutions to cooperate one another as follows (Ibid., 6-7): 
･ All Institutions review organisational arrangements and ensure th~t environmental requirements are reflected 
in their own decisions; 
･ The Commission review existing policies and incorporate environme~Ital concerns into all key proposals; 
･ The Council and the Parliament identify a set of priority actions for PEI; 
･ The European Council review periodically environmental integration into key sectoral polioies 
On this base, 
'The Council, Parliament and Commission should jointly diseuss the development of mechanisms for 
implementing these guidelines and for monitoring their implementation.' (Ibid., 7) 
In the policy document that proposed this Guidelines, the Commission states that 'Fulfilment of (Kyoto) 
. must become a primary consideration in the framing of all key policy areas' (Ibid., 9). This commitment 
Guidelines have initiated and activated the Cardiff process since 1998 and the EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy since 2001. And these policy processes have produced policy responses of the Council in the form of 
policy planning reports; 
3 GQnzalez-Calatayud shows uB the following: Agriculture: 2218th douneil M~e~ing, 15 Nov. 19gg (Strategy on Environmental Integration and 
Sustainable Development in the Common Agricultural Poli.cy established by the Agriculture Counoil); Transport: 2204th Couneil Meeting. 6 
Oct. 1 999 (Transport and Environment: Report to the European Council in Helsioki); Energy: 2230th Council Meeting 2 Dee. 1999 (Strategy for 
Integrating Environmental Aspects and Sustainable Development into Energy Polioy); Intemal Market: 2210th Council Meeting 28 Oet. 1999 
(Integration of Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development into Internal Market Policy); DeY~lopment: 2215th Council Meeting 11 
Nov. 1999 (DeYelppment Councii Report including Elements of ~ Comprehensive Strategy on the Integrattorl of EnYironment and Sustainable 
Development into EC Economio and DeYelopment Cooperation); Industry: 2214th Counoil Mee~ng 9 Nov. 1999 (Integration of Sustainable 
Development into EU Industrial Polioy). See Gonzalez-Calatayud (2002: 307). 
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4-3 Policy-making 
EU climate policy-making has been carried out by the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), which 
was initiated by the Commission in'the year 2000. The document, 'Main Elements of the ECCP to be initiated by 
the European Commission' (COM (2000) 88, Annex 2), Iaunched 'a multi-stakeholder consultative process' 
(CorDmission 200lb: 6) for adopting instruments of EU climate policies This can be said to be done in some 
degree at the expense of the Comnilssion's prerogative of the 'initiative' (COM (2000) 88: 5-6), because the 
Comrrrission announced that the ECCP results would be converted into 'a clear political commitment from the 
Commission' (Commission 2003: 6) in supranational legal processes based on the Community method, 
However, the expected list of common and co-ordinated policies and measures on climate change was attached 
with the Annex 3 of that document (COM (2000) 88) as if the Commission confines results of the ECCP within 
an expected scope. 
The origin of the ECCP was the Commission Communication for preparirrg for the implementing of the Kyoto 
Protocol (COM (1999) 230) On this basis, the Environmental Council made proposals in June 1998 and 
October 1999, for urging the Commission to put forward a list of climate policies and measure and to prepare 
policy proposals (Commission 2003: 4) Soon after this political process, the ECCP has become 'an essential part 
of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy' (Commission 200lb: 157). There were consensus between the 
Conunission. the Council and the Parliament. In October 2000, the Enviroumental Committee of the Parliament 
adopted an opinion on the ECCP, which stressed the priority of the ECCP (Commission 200lb: 7). In November 
2000, the Commission submitted a progress report to the 'special climate Council' In the second ECCP report, 
the Commission emphasises the broad consensus at this first phase, stating that: 
'Despite the very short time available, the Programme already set out a first list of likely measures in all 
the relevant sectors taking fully into account the proposals made in the Parliament's Resolution and by 
the Council' (Commission 2003: 7) 
The objectives of the ECCP is 'to identify and develop all those elements of a European Climate Change 
Strategy that are necessary for the implementation of th~ Kyoto Protocol' (COM (2000) 88, Annex 2, S) and to 
pursue 'a co-operative effort of all relevant stakeholders such as representatives of the Commission, the Member 
States, industry and the NGO conununity' (Ibid.) The policy target is quite a simple no matter how the effect of 
anthropogenic GHGS emissions on the rise of global surface average temperature, or global warming, is still 
uncertain: the reduction of 336 MtC02eq in 2010 with respect to 1990 (Commission 200lb: 5) This amount of 
reduction is wbat the Commission calculated for corresponding to an 8% reduction in GHGS emissions from 
1990 Ievels by 2008-2012, which is the Kyoto commitment of the EU15 (Ibid.) A multi-stakeholder 
consultative process was launched for envisaging policies and measures to achieve this objective. 
The aforementioned document, 'Main Elements of the ECCP', set up Steering Committee and Working Groups 
The founer is composed of all DGS that take part in the ECCP (COM (2000) 88, Annex2, 8). The WGS have 
their 'specific set of stakeholders representing a European rather than a national or regional clientel' and about 15 
persons par WG (Ibid, 8) Respective WGS have reporting requirements to the Steering Committee (Ibid., 9) so 
that on this base the Comnrission can prepare 'policy proposals containing instruments such as technical 
regulation, taxation, voluntary agreements, or flexible mechanisms' (1bid.) Initially, frve WGS were set up, and 
further WGS were expected to be established later (1bid., 10) lil the course of the ECCP, the following WGS and 
sub-WGs have been activated (Commission 200lb: 6 and Commission 2003: 5): 
･ WG1: 'Flexible mechanisms' 
Sub-WGs: 'JI/CDM' and 'Emission trading'. 
-78-
･ WG2: 'Energy supply' 
･ WG3:'Energy consumption' 
Sub-WGs: 'Energy efficiency in end-use equipment and in.dustrial processes' (a joint sub-workh)g 
group with WG5). 
･ WG4: 'Transport' 
Sub-WGs: 'Vehicle technology and fuel', 'Transport infrastructure', use and charging', 'Freight logistics 
and intermodality', 'Awareness raising and behavioural change' and 'Data validation'. 
･ WG5:'Industry' 
Sub-WGs: 'Fluorinated gases', 'Renewable raw materials', 'Voluntary agreements' and 'Energy 
efficienby in end-use equipment and industrial process~s' (a joint sub-working group with WG3) 
･ WG6: 'Research' 
Sub-WGs: 'the scientific aspects of sinks' 
･ WG7: 'Agriculture' 
･ WG: 'Sinks in agricultural soils' (WG number is unknown) 
･ WG: 'Forest-related sinks' (WG number is unknown) 
Wide-ranging stakeholders have been invited to these WGS and submitted each policy report as if they are 
policy-makers in collaboration with the Commission. Table 3 summarises participants into the WGS They are as 
follows (see Table 3; cf. Michaelowa 1998). 
･ Commission officials (from various DGS such as ENV, ENTR, ECFIN, ELARG. TREN. RES, RTD, AGRI) 
･ National experts and independent researchers 
･ Emitters groups such as UNICE, and sector-specific groups and national lobby groups 
･ Climate protection industry such as COGEN Europe (www.cogen,org). 
･ Environmental lobbies such as Climate Network Europe (a network group of various national NGOs), WWF, 
Greenpeace and ICLEI (this is a loeal government network group for local enviroumental initiatives) 
Attention must be paid to the participation of one member of the Parliament into WG5's sub-group that 
addresses voluntary agreements, with which the Parliament has been concerned because of the possibility that 
the Parliarnent may be circumvented and left out of policy-ma~;ing processes. In addition, the participation of 
officials of CDM Executive board of UNFCCC, EBRT) and EIB into JI/CDM sub-group needs to be kept in 
mind for understandjJrg an open policy-making proce~s in the EU climate change strategy 
To a large degree, the Comrnission has orientated these WGS towards the use of new modes of govemance, 
though improvements in the implementation of existing legislation and the planning of new legislation are at the 
same time stressed (Commission 200lb: 157). Basic strategies produeed by the ECCP are as follows. 
･ Taking the full range of policy instruments including legislation (existing, new and planned), voluntary 
actions, supporting measures, awareness and best practice initiatives, market instruments and 
research/technology development (1bid., 158), 
･ Taking the full range of stakeholders in the process of developing a strategy with a view to launching a 
process that gathers the required expertise and promotes consensus-building (Commission 2003: 4-5) 
･ Horizontal policy integration that enables all DGS to collaborate one another and establishes a single 
coherent strategy (Ibid., 4 and Commission 200lb: 157). 
･ Target-sharing and monitoripg with a view to underlining 'the responsibility of Member States in establishing 
their own policies and measures' for reducing GHGS (Commission 2003: 6) 
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The first phase of the ECCP identified 42･ cost-effective measures, which was expected to total 'a technical 
pdtential of 664-765 MtC02eq' (Commission 2003: 6) While some of them are, or going to be, taken shape in 
forms of directives, such as th~ 2003 EU Enaission Trading Scheme Directive, the 2004 JI/CDM Directive, and 
directives on biofuels, energy performance of building, energy efficient phblic procurem~nt, fluorinated gases, 
combined heat and power, energy services, and so on, these contain more or less flexible measures sueh as 
target-sharing and monitoring schemes. Following the first phase in which 'the ECCP acted predominantly as an 
initiator, catalyst and discussion forum to prePare a strategy, the second phase of the ECCP has moved to 
'monitoring and implementation of the agreed measures' (Ibid.). 
4-4 Individual Measures 
In this way, the EU climate change strategy has been produced. Examples of individual measures are as follows 
4-4-1 Market Instruments 
In January 2005, the 2003 EU ETS (emission trading scheme) Directive (Dir 2003187fEC) entered into force. In 
the frrst phase, about 12000 plants in the industries of iron & steeL glass, cement, pottery and bricks across 
EU25, which cover about 40% of total C02 emissions in the EU, are under this scheme (EurActiv.com, ~1 April 
2005). Allowances. to emit C02 are now a goods for businesses to be able to sell and buy; however, if emissions 
exceed the allowances, which are subject to Member States' national allocation plans (NAP), fines of 40 euros 
per excess tonne of C02 will be imposed. Three yeals later, the fines will rise to 100 euros. This EU ETS is a 
typical market in~trument, which the 5th and 6th EAPS have envisaged 
A point is the allocation of the allowances (Wettestad 2005: 19; Butzengeiger and Michaelowa 2004: I 17-8). In 
the EU ETS Directive, this aJlooation of emission entitlements is arranged in accordance with NAPs. Although 
the Conunission provided a broad criteria, Member States can decide the amount and opt-out of some individual 
plants, unless the Commission vetoes it. Already legal disputes occur, for example between the UK and the 
Commission, concerning the amount of the allowances (EurActiv.com, 1 1 Mzirch 2005). Mbmber States are also 
allowed to issue additional allowances in case of force majeure. In addition, the allocation mechanism is 
basically not auctioning but grandfathering, though the Scheme ~rescribes 5a/o auctioning up to 2008 and lO% 
after (Wettestad 2005: 6). Incidentally, the 100% auctioning can be s4id to theoretically implicate the same 
effect as the introduction of a sort of carbon tax in terms of its effect on businesses 
In the 1990s, the EU was a sceptic to ETS; however, 'the very about-turn of the EU from ETS fiend to front 
runner' (Wettestad 2005: 2) occurred, thanks td 'the strong entrepreneurial role of the Commission' (Ibid.) 
Butzengeiger and Michaelowa points out that 'the speed of its implementation has surprised seasoned observers 
of Brussels decision processes' (2004: 118) According to the study of Wettestad, the background of this quick 
turn is: the failure of the adoption of a carbon tax; the existence of the IPPC system (which has already set an 
emission permit scheme); Iiberalisation of an energy market (which may be disadvantageous for renewable 
energy); experiences of ETS among central industrial actors and by some Member States (the Danish system and 
the UK system); and the rejection by G.W. Bush administration of the Kyoto Protocol (which prompted EU 
leaders to save the Kyoto Protoool and to get the leading position of global environmental diplomacy) 
(Wettestad 2005: 10, 12) 
Attention needs to be paid to the legal base of this Dir~ctive, which was Article 175 (1) In a sense, it can be said 
that this ultimate lrlarket instrument was produced, in the context of international environmehtal politics, by a 
forced collaboration between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. The 2004 JI/CDM Directive will 
make this market instrument develop furthef, by activating flexible Kyoto mechanisms 
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4-4-2 Co-/Self-Regulations 
In 1999 and 2000~ the Commission reached environmental agreement.s with ACEA (the European automobile 
manufacturefs associations) (Commission Recom. 1999/1251EC), with JAMA (the Japanese automobile 
manufacturers associations) ~Commission Recom 2000/3041EC) and with KAMA (the Korean automobile 
manufacturers associations) (Conunission Recom. 2000/303/EC). The ACEA also represents the major US car 
manufacturers (Gonzalez-Calatayud 2002: 304), and therefore these agreements cover almost all car 
manufacturers in Europe A11 Iegal bases are Article 211 EC, which is competences conferred on the 
Commission. The commitments are to achieve the reduction of C02 emissions from new passenger cars as 
follows: 
･ ACEA: 140g/kln C02 by 2008 and 120g/km C02 by 2012. 
. JAMA: 140g/km C02 by 2009 and 120 g/km C02 by 2012 
･ KAMA: 140g/km C02 by 2009 and 120 g/ku C02 by 2012 
These envir.onmental agreements also provides a scheme of collaboration between the Commission and these 
automobile manufacturers associations, and the strueture of the scheme is the same in three agreements, as 
follows: 
･ Cooperation between the Commission and an association in monitoring of the commitments. 
･ Interim evaluation of the potential for additional fuel-efficiency improvements towards the objective of 120 
g/km C02 by 2012= 
･ Trial by individual members of an association to place on the market the models emitting 120 glkm C02 or 
less. 
･ Intermediate C02 emission target in the range of 165 - 170 g/km C02 in an early stage. 
･ The additional counting of target achieveinent in cases of the technological innovation for replacihg 
conventional cars to new cars that do not produce C02 emissions or using alternative fuels 
It can be saiu that these agreements are an outcome of political exchange between the Commission and the 
associations. The Commission would not make a legislative proposal, and not provide fiscal measures, on C02 
emissions from passenger cars, unless the associations would faiil to achieve the targets to reduee C02 emissions 
at their own initiatives and methods 
The Parliament has rejected the u~e of environmental agreements, and instead claimed the adoption of 
legislation and fiscal measures (Lefevere 2000: 368; cf. OJ 1997 C132/210) The policy process has certainly 
proceeded in the collaboration between the Commission and the Council. ACEA initially rejected the proposal 
of the Comrnission and proposed 'a target of 150-160g/kQIC02 by 2005 (1bid.); however; in December 1997, the 
Environmental Council rejected this ACEA's proposal, following the suggestion of the Commission (1bid.). The 
threat of legislation can be said to function in this case. ACEA revi.sed its proposal and offered the target of 
140glkmC02 by 2008 The Commission aicepted it, and then finally the Environmental Council approved the 
agreement with ACEA (1bid., 368-9). 
Various industry associations welcomed the agreement. In contrast, environmental NGOS and the Parliarnent 
weire opposed to this (1bi,~ In addition, aitention also needs to be paid to the fact thatthe COR and the ECOSOC 
have no say (Kramer 2003: 284) The Cornmission already issued Communication on environmental agreements 
(COM (96) 561) and Commission Recommendation ooncerning them (96/733/EC), in which a guideline was set 
up: consultation, contractual form for the legal status of agreements, quantified objectives, staged approach, 
monitoring of results, public information, transpareuey, independent verification of results, and so on (COM 
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(96) 561: Il-17). Already many and various environmental agreements have been concluded at European and 
national levels (for example, see Table 1), and these guidelines require to be further refined. In prder to reitelate 
these points, the Commission further issued the Conunu~rication conceming Enviroumental Agreements at 
Community Level (COM (2002) 412), Notwithstanding the checklists and their further refinement, 
environmental agreements continue to be controversial 
4-4-3 Monitoring and Reporting Requirements 
In 1993 the EU adopted Decision for a nionitoring scheme (Decision 93/389/EC), in which Member States were 
required to monitor all anthropogenic GHGs. This Decision has been amended twice by Decision 1999/296/EC 
and Decision 280/2004/EC. The last one is entirely devoted to implementing Kyoto mechanisms, which are ET 
(emission trading). JI Goint implementation) and CDM (clean development mechanism) These mechanisms 
need the national registry system of Kyoto units (for exalnple. CRU (certified reduction unit) for JI and ERU 
(emission reduction unit) for CDM) These Decisions have obliged the Commission to issue regular reports with 
a view to grasping the state of affairs in GHGS emissions in the EU. Therefore, this monitoring scheme is not 
only for a learning system bctween Member States, but also for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The EU has also operationaised an issue-specific monitoring seheme, whioh is to monitor the average specific 
emissions of C02 from new passenger cars (Decision 1753/2000/EC). As noted above, this is to supplement the 
environmental agreements with car manufacturer associations. Article 8 of this Decision reads that: 
'The data collected undet the monitoring system from the year 2003 onward shall serve as the basis for 
monitoring voluntary obligations to reduce einissions of C02 from motor vehicles agreed between the 
Commission and the automobile industry and, where necessary, for their revision.' 
This Decision was adopted based on Article 175 (1) EC. In the, process of co-decision procedure, the Parliament 
and the Council formulated 'an objective (,f 120g/km (5 Iitres/100km for petrol engines and 4.5 Iitres/100kn for 
diesel engines) as a mean value for C02 emissions in 2005 (2010 at the latest) (Ibid., preamble). In this way, 
monitoring schemes support environmental agreements. 
4-4-4 Indicative Targets and Reporting Requirements 
Despite the fact that energy policies are the prerogative of Member States, already around 100 instruments 
(directives~ regulatioris and decisions) have been adopted in the EU. However, this is far from an EU common 
energy action (Collier 2002: 177). As noted above, in the early stage of EU climate change policies before the 
year 1997, fmancial supports were carried out in SAVE for energy efficiency and ALTENER for renewable 
energy In addition to these financial supports, two directives have been adopted in the couTse of the ECCP: the 
2001 Directive on the promotion of electricity produced frQm renewable energy sources in the internal electricity 
market (Dir 20011771EC) and the 2003 Direotive on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable 
fuels (Dir 20a3/30/EC). The former set the indicative target of 22.1% share of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources in the EU (Kramer 2003: 307). The latter set the indicative target of 5.759{* share of 
biofuels in total sales of fuels in the EU (Ibid.). Both directives obliges Member States to submit progress 
reports Attention must be paid to legal bases of these two directives, which are Article 175 (1) EC, not 175 (2) 
EC despite t~le fact that energy is listed up in the latter. This means that the Parliament can be involved into the 
leglslative process not with consultation procedure but co-decision procedure 
4-4-5 Flexible Fiscal Arrangements 
As noted above, the Commission aimed at the adoption of a carbon/energy tax in the early stage of EU climate 
change policies While the Commission's effort was in vain, the use of 'enhanced cooperation' for EU tax 
-82-
policies has sometimes been suggested in the Council (Gonzalez-Calatayud 2002: 303). The 2003 Directive for 
restructuring the EU framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (Dir 2003/961EC) seems to be 
one of examples for a differentiated policy co-ordination model. On the one hand, the legal base is not Artiele 
175 but 93 EC (Taxation). This means that the consultation procedure was applied in which the Parliament 
cannot have a veto power. On the other hand, the PEI is referred to in the preamble (para.6), and the notion is 
reaffiuned such that 'energy prices are key elements of Community energy, transport and environment policies' 
(para.12). On this basis, this Directive offers the view that '[tlhe taxation of energy products and, where 
appropriate, electricity is ohe of the instruments available for achieving the Kyoto Protocol objectives' (Ibid., 
preamble, para.7). I~l this way, the rationales of this Directive are found not only in the buildirrg and functioning 
of intemal markets but also in climate change 
This Directive sets the minimum levels of taxation on electricity and energy products. On this basis, flexible 
alTangements are set up, in which almost all competences remain in Member States. They can 'define and 
implement policies appropriate to their national circumstances' (preamble, para.9). 'Fiscal arrangements . . for 
the taxation of energy products and slectricity are a matter for each Member State to decide' (1bid., para.11). 
Only if Member States wish to introduce those taxation, they ~re required 'to comply with the Community 
minimum taxation levels' (1bid., para.10). In addition, if Member States apply 'differentiated national rates of 
taxation to the same product', they are obliged to respect 'Community minimum levels of taxation and internal 
market and competition rules' (1bid., para.15) It can be said that the softness in this type of legislation would 
become beneficial insofar as a mutual learning of effective taxation policies on GHGS emissions reduction must 
be carried out in a huge variety of national circumstances. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The softness has increasingly become main elements in EU environmental governance, both in forms and 
contents of individual measures. In this regard, the EU climate change strategy is illustrative of soft governance, 
in which the political process emerges that can be characterised as civic inclusion in the process of political 
goal-setting arid softer legalisation for monitoring and controlling compliance. The softening of environmental 
govemance modes needs to be considered in terms of the deepening of European integration, Under the retreat 
of the EU from the legislative policy of harmonisation, is it possible to regard soft governance as an alternative 
way of European integration? The softening of governance modes required to be considered not only from the 
research interest of public policy, but also from the viewpoint of integration studies. The EU climate change 
strategy is one of useful research fields for reflecting on the implication of the softening of governance modes on 
both European integration and disintegration. Here we need to ask a question of what integration means. This 
will be a next research theme. 
-83-
Table I : EU Soft instruments to address Climate Change 
Target-setting 
Policy-f raming 
Policy-making 
Individual 
Measures 
The 1990 Target Settillg in the joint EnYironment ai]d Energy Council. October 1990 
binding 
The 1998 Burden-sharing Agreemellt in the 2106th Environrnental Counoil. June 
Legal translation by Decision 2002/358/EC of transposing the Kyoto Protocol. 
N n-
1998 
The Principle of Environmental Integratioll. Article 6 EC 
Guidelines for a Partnership for Integration of Envirollment into other Policies. 
COM (98) 333 
The CardiffProcess since th~ 1998 European Council. 
The EU Sustainable Development Strategy since the 2001 Gotheuburg European Council 
Main Elements of the European Climate Ch~nge Programme (ECCP) to be 
initiated by the European Commission. COM (2000) 88, Annex 2 
Steering Committees. A11 DGS involved 
Working Groups. Each has a specifio set of stakeholders. A multi-stakeholder consultative 
process. 
End Product and Timeframe. On this basis, the Commission will make proposals to the 
Parliament and the Counoil 
･ Market lilstruments EU Emission Trading Scheme. Dir. 20031871EC 
JI/CDM Scheme. Dir. 2004/101/EC 
･ C(j-/Self-Regulatlons General Guidelines for the use of Environmental Agreements. Commission Recom: 
96n33/EC. 
Environmental Agreements with ACEA, JAMA and KAMA Cdmmission Recom 
1999/125, 303 and 3041EC. 
A[lother examples (Commission 2003: 58) 
Volu[rt a reements: industry-wide + quantitative targets: Sta[Idby TV and TCR / 
Washing machines / Refrigerators, freezers and their combinatidns / Detergents (energy 
saving consumer behaviour washing machines) / Standby Audio / Dishwashers. 
Codes of oonduct: individual companies + quantitative targets: Digital TV services / 
External power supplies. 
Volunfar ro rammes: individual companies + best practice: Green Light (non-
residential lighting) 
Voluntar ener labellin : EU energy star (for office equipment): EU environmental 
product declarations 
Eco-Iabel: The granting of the eco-label is subjeot to demanding energy efficiency 
levels! 
･ Monitoring and Reporting Requireinents A Mechanism for Monitoring Community GHGS Ernissions and for Implernenting the 
~(yoto Protocol. Deaision 280/20041EC. 
A Scheme to Monitor the Average Speaific Emissions of C02 from New Passenger Cars 
Decision 1753/2000/EC 
･ Indicative Targets and Reporting Requirements The Promotion. of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal 
Electricity Market. Dir 200ln7/EC 
The Promotion of the Use of Biofuels or other Renewable Fuels. Dir 2003/30fEC. 
･ Flexible Fiscal Arrallgements Restructuring the Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity. Dir 2003/96/EC 
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WG5 Industry 
WG5 Industry 
sub-group: 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
WG6 
Research 
WG7 
Agrieulture 
･ DG ENTR 
･ DG ENV 
･ DG RTD 
･ DG TRl~N 
' DG ENTR 
' DG ENV 
'DC~RTD 
' DG T~EN 
' the European 
Parliament 
･ DG RTD 
･ DG ENV 
･ DG JRC 
･ DO TREN 
･ DG ENTR 
･ DG AGRI 
･ DG AGRl 
･ DG ENV 
･ D(~ ENTR 
･UK 
･ Frauce 
･ Austria 
･ Italy 
･ Denmark 
･ Denmark 
･ Finland 
･ Germany 
･ Italy 
･ Sweden 
･ UK 
･ Franoe 
･ Sweden 
･ Italy 
･ Portugal 
･ Germany 
･UK 
･ Italy 
･ Netherlands 
･ France 
･ Ireland 
' CEFl:C 
･ CEMBUREAU ' CEPI 
' EUROFER 
' EUROPIA 
･ Orgalime!CECED ' UEAPM13 
' UNICE 
･ BDI 
･ CECED 
･ CEFIC 
･ CEMBUREAU 
･ CEPI 
･ DSM 
･ EURELECTRIC 
･ EUROFER 
･ UEAPM1~ 
･ UNICE 
' European Business 
Council for 
Sustainable Energy 
Future 
' Gerllng Insurance 
Company 
･ COPA/COGEGA 
･ COPA 
･ Hydro Agri Deutsch]and GmbH 
･ ENCA 
･ Norsk Hydro Porsgrunn - Norway 
' Climate Network 
Euro pe 
･WWF ･ Greenpeace 
･ Climate Network EuTo pe 
･WWF 
･ Climate Network Europe 
' Birdlife Intemational 
' CEPF (Confederation 
of European Folest 
Owners) 
Sources: the 2001 report; other Commission's documents (Commission's Web Site 
http://europa.eu,int/comm/environment/climat/ecc p,htn) 
* This table does not cover aJl working groups and independent external experts such as academic institutions 
and consultants. Altemates members are also excluded 
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